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Abstract
As sensor networks get increasingly deployed in real-world scenarios such as home and industrial automation, there is a similarly
growing demand in analyzing, consolidating, and storing the data collected by these networks. The dynamic, on-demand resources
oﬀered by today’s cloud computing environments promise to satisfy this demand. However, prevalent security concerns still hinder
the integration of sensor networks and cloud computing. In this paper, we show how recent progress in standardization can provide
the basis for protecting data from diverse sensor devices when outsourcing data processing and storage to the cloud. To this end, we
present our Sensor Cloud Security Library (SCSlib) that enables cloud service developers to transparently access cryptographically
protected sensor data in the cloud. SCSlib speciﬁcally allows domain specialists who are not security experts to build secure cloud
services. Our evaluation proves the feasibility and applicability of SCSlib for commodity cloud computing environments.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Sensor networks, which sense information about the environment, and cloud computing, which realizes elastic
storage and computing, attract a lot of attention from both industry and academia. Their combination, referred to
as sensor cloud, allows to enhance the potential application areas of sensor networks with the strengths of cloud
computing. By utilizing the cloud, sensor data can be collected, processed, and stored at large scales as well as shared
world wide. Thanks to the cloud computing paradigm, the required storage and processing resources can elastically
and automatically be scaled on-demand with a pay-as-you-go billing model. We consider a scenario, in which owners
of sensor networks (i.e., private end users, companies, or public institutions) connect their sensor networks to the
cloud. There, services selected by the owner of the sensor network operate on the outsourced sensor data1–3.
As sensor data often contains sensitive information, a major challenge when interconnecting sensor networks with
the cloud are security concerns. Importantly, traditional transport security mechanisms between data sources and the
cloud do not suﬃce to protect sensor data in an end-to-end manner as such channel security is typically terminated
at the entry point to the cloud. In contrast, object-level security between data sources and cloud services aﬀords the
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +49-241-80-21425 ; fax: +49-241-80-22222.
E-mail address: henze@comsys.rwth-aachen.de
   t rs. Published by Elsevier B V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://cre tivecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the Program Chairs of EUSPN-2014 and ICTH 2014.
371 Martin Henze et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  37 ( 2014 )  370 – 375 
{  "bn":"weather-station-01", 
   "bt":"1445437740",
   "e":[{
      "n":"temperature",
      "sv":"23", 
      "t":"0"
   },{
      "n":"humidity",
      "sv":"40",
      "t":"0.5"
   }]}
$.e[n='temperature'].sv
1) Select value 
 "ev":[{"unprotected":{
   "alg":"dir",
   "enc":"AESCBC192",
   "kid":"c730[...]597f",
   "typ":"sv"},
  "iv":"AQEB[...]AA==",
  "ciphertext":"38xx[...]UA=="}]
2a) Encrypt value 
"sig":{"header":{"alg":"ES224"},
   "signature":"VeVr[...]Uj4="} 2b) Add signature 
{  "kid":"c730[...]597f",
   "kty":"oct",
   "alg":"AESCBC192",
   "k":"QFfj[...]DyM="}
3) Distribute keys 
Fig. 1: Overview of the process of protecting a sensor data item for the cloud and distributing the data protection keys.
required end-to-end protection of outsourced sensor data. However, applying object security in the context of sensor
clouds has two inherent challenges. First, sensor data can originate from a wide variety of sensor nodes and thus can
be structured arbitrarily. This signiﬁcantly complicates the application of object security mechanisms. Most notably,
cloud services have to be informed how data has been protected to successfully decrypt and verify the integrity and
the authenticity of the received data. Second, object security operates at the application level. Hence, contrary to
transport security, object security is not a transparent security mechanism for cloud services. However, implementing
the necessary security mechanisms is a laborious and error-prone task. It is our strong believe that developers of cloud
service should not need to be responsible for realizing security functionality as they often are not security experts.
To overcome these inherent challenges, we present the following two contributions: i) a widely-applicable, standards-
based approach to represent and protect sensor data in the cloud (Sec. 3), and ii) the design of our generic Sensor Cloud
Security Library, SCSlib (Sec. 4). We speciﬁcally develop SCSlib for cloud service developers to transparently access
sensor data without the need to care for security. To motivate our work, we discuss related work in Sec. 2. In Sec. 5,
we evaluate the performance of SCSlib and show its general feasibility, before we conclude this paper in Sec. 6.
2. Related Work
Early approaches in the area of combining sensor networks or the Internet of Things with cloud computing, espe-
cially in the area of health care and ambient assisted living, identiﬁed security as a crucial corner stone4,5. However,
these initial solutions provided only rudimentary security measures, e.g., transport security or authentication using
passwords5. We proposed a comprehensive security architecture for sensor data in the cloud in earlier work, en-
abling end-to-end security from the sensor network to an authorized cloud service1,3,6,7. Our initial approach did not
consider ﬂexible conﬁguration of security mechanisms and a transparent access to protected sensor data for cloud ser-
vices. However, ﬂexible conﬁguration of security mechanisms is required to support diﬀerent application scenarios,
while transparent data access allows also non-security experts to develop cloud services.
In order to enable ﬂexible conﬁguration of security mechanisms, Itani and Kayssi proposed SPECSA8. Their
policy format allows to specify which parts of a message have to be protected. However, they assume messages with
a ﬁxed structure and use the same encryption key for all parts of the same security level. Hence, their approach is not
suitable for the sensor cloud scenario, as this scenario requires ﬁne-grained, ﬂexible access control.
Several approaches for supporting the developer by abstracting from security paradigms have been proposed. GSS-
API by Linn9 provides security services in order to protect the communication between two entities. However, in our
scenario we require security at the granularity of objects instead of communication channels in order to protect sensor
data also during storage. JSAL by Huang et al. 10 is a security aspect library. In their approach, the developer has to
apply the security measures manually, which requires expertise in the area of security.
To conclude, there is a need for a common way to represent protected sensor data and a security abstraction layer
for accessing protected sensor data in the cloud that allows non-security experts to develop secure cloud services.
3. Protecting Sensor Data for the Cloud
Depending on the sensor device, sensed information varies considerably regarding its structure (i.e., the serializa-
tion of measured data and meta information), the number of measurements ﬁelds (e.g., a single value for a simple
temperature sensor or multiple values in case of a complex industrial control unit), and the units of these ﬁelds (e.g.,
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degree Celsius, hertz, joule). A promising approach to unify the representation of such diverse sensor data items
is SenML11, which has been proposed for standardization at the IETF. It supports JSON, XML, and Eﬃcient XML
Interchange (EXI) for serializing sensor data. To showcase our approach, we focus on the JSON representation of
SenML. Still, our ﬁndings can also be extended to other data models or other serializations, e.g., XML. Independent
from the actual representation and serialization of sensor data, we identify the following three essential tasks: i) iden-
tifying those parts in the serialized sensor data that should be covered by the protection, ii) performing the necessary
cryptographic operations and augmenting protected sensor data such that an authorized cloud service can reverse these
operations, as well as iii) securely distributing the employed data protection keys to authorized cloud services. In the
following, we discuss these tasks in more detail. An illustration of this process can be found in Fig. 1.
Specifying Coverage of Sensor Data Protection. In the scope of this paper, we assume that sensor data items are
readily serialized in SenML. To this end, sensor devices either natively output SenML-encoded sensor data items or a
gateway at the boundary of the sensor network has to translate the employed proprietary sensor data formats to SenML.
An essential part of protecting such SenML-encoded sensor data items for the cloud then is to encrypt the contained
information. However, encrypting sensor data items as a whole is infeasible as certain meta information (e.g., sensor
node identiﬁer and timestamp) is required for indexing purposes in order to aﬀord an eﬃcient retrieval of sensor data
in the cloud. Moreover, such holistic protection would restrict service access granting to an all-or-nothing approach
as all information was encrypted with the same key. Especially in the context of industrial automation, however, it is
necessary to break down access granting to individual data ﬁelds. This way, the manufacturer of an industrial machine
can, e.g., access certain measurement values for monitoring the health of the machine without getting to know details
about the product that is currently being processed on this machine. Consequently, to provide conﬁdentiality on a ﬁne-
granular basis, we require a way to address parts of a sensor data item. We facilitate JSONPath12 for this purpose,
which allows to address arbitrary ﬁelds in a JSON object (similarly, XPath can be used for XML). This way, the parts
of a sensor data item that should be encrypted can be speciﬁed (see Step 1 in Fig. 1). Notably, digital signatures that
provide integrity and authenticity of the protected sensor data item cover the entire data item and thus do not require
such ﬁne-granular control.
Representation of Protected Sensor Data. In the next step, the data ﬁelds identiﬁed with JSONPath need to be en-
crypted. To this end, we use standard symmetric encryption that aﬀords eﬃcient protection of bulk data. Still, we
design our approach to be ﬂexible regarding the employed symmetric-key primitives and key lengths in order to allow
for scenario-speciﬁc security/performance trade-oﬀs and to account for potential future advances in cryptography that
may lead to certain primitives no longer being considered secure. However, due to this ﬂexibility, simply replacing
the plain value in the sensor data item with the encrypted value is not suﬃcient. Instead, the cloud services require
additional information, e.g., the used encryption algorithm, an identiﬁer for the used data protection key, or the ini-
tialization vector to decrypt the protected data ﬁelds. Hence, this information also has to be encoded in the sensor
data item. This information can be expressed using JSON Web Encryption (JWE)13, which is a proposed standard
for representing encrypted content using JSON. Thus, the plain value in the sensor data item is replaced by a JWE
object that contains the encrypted value and the additional information needed for decrypting this value (see Step 2a in
Fig. 1). Additionally, the whole sensor data item should be integrity and authenticity protected. For this, the common
best-practice is to use public-key signatures. Similarly to JWE, we employ JSON Web Signature (JWS)13 to represent
a public-key signature with JSON. Hence, a JWS-encoded signature is added to the protected sensor data items (see
Step 2b in Fig. 1).
Distributing Keying Material. In the last step, the data protection keys have to be distributed to authorized services.
These keys are needed by the services to decrypt the individual data ﬁelds of a sensor data item. We assume that each
service is in possession of a public/private key-pair. In order to grant a service access to (parts of) a sensor data item,
the corresponding data protection keys are then encrypted with the public key of the respective service and uploaded
to the cloud. For this, similar to JWE and JWS, we leverage JSON Web Key (JWK)13 to represent the encrypted key
in JSON format (see Step 3 in Fig. 1). This way, only an authorized service is able to decrypt the data protection
key and thus gain access to the data. Whenever the service requires the data protection key for decrypting a sensor
data item, it queries the cloud for that key and decrypts it with the service’s private key. We additionally periodically
exchange data protection keys to increase security14,15 and oﬀer ﬁne-granular access control with respect to these key
change intervals.
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4. Transparent Access to Protected Sensor Data for Cloud Services
In order to allow cloud service developers to access protected sensor data in the cloud without the need to care about
decryption, signature veriﬁcation, and key management, we propose the Sensor Cloud Security Library (SCSlib)a.
We implemented SCSlib as a C library and make use of the cryptographic algorithms of the OpenSSL library16.
In the following, we discuss our design and implementation of SCSlib with respect to the following three main
functionalities: i) interfacing with the cloud, ii) processing of sensor data items, i.e., veriﬁcation and decryption, as
well as iii) caching of cryptographic keys for performance improvement.
Interfacing with the Cloud. Our design of SCSlib is driven by the goal to provide ﬂexibility and re-usability on the
one hand and transparency for cloud service developers on the other hand. Hence, we decided to develop a library
that can be integrated into a cloud service SDK, such as Google Cloud SDK and Amazon Web Services SDK, and
directly being used by the service developer. This way, the security-critical computations take place in the context
of the service and no secrets (e.g., the service’s private key) have to be revealed to others. Additionally, this design
allows the cloud service developer to implement (parts) of the necessary cryptographic operations himself if he does
not (fully) trust the provided implementation. This property is aimed at further reducing security concerns when
outsourcing sensor data to the cloud by aﬀording an increased transparency of the employed security mechanisms.
For the decryption and veriﬁcation of sensor data items, SCSlib requires the public key of the data source as
well as the keys used for encrypting the individual data ﬁelds. We designed SCSlib to use callback functions, i.e.,
functionality provided by the cloud service SDK, for retrieving the necessary keying material. This allows each cloud
service SDK to implement the communication with the cloud speciﬁc to the individual scenario.
Processing of Sensor Data Items. To invoke the processing of a sensor data item, SCSlib provides a notably slim
API that consists of three public methods: sc verify data item() for verifying the integrity of a data item,
sc decrypt data item() for decrypting a data item, and sc process data item() which combines the pre-
vious two methods. Data items are passed to the library as JSON-encoded strings, which yields a simple and portable
interface. First, integrity and authenticity of the sensor data item should be checked. For this, SCSlib looks up the
public key of the data source using the corresponding callback function (see above) and then veriﬁes the digital sig-
nature using the retrieved public key. In order to decrypt the sensor data item, SCSlib iterates recursively over the
JSON-serialized object to search for JWE objects representing an encrypted sensor value. For each JWE object, the
data protection key needed to decrypt this data ﬁeld is requested using the above described callback function. Then,
the encrypted sensor value can be decrypted, which allows to restore the original value in the JSON-serialized sensor
data item. If a cloud service is not permitted access to a speciﬁc data ﬁeld, the corresponding data protection key is
not available to this service. Conceptually, there are two possibilities for handling this exception. Either the encrypted
sensor value can remain in the data item (which allows the cloud service to notice that it cannot access this speciﬁc
ﬁeld) or it can be removed (which yields performance). Our implementation of SCSlib supports both approaches and
the actual behavior can be set via a conﬁguration ﬂag.
Caching of Cryptographic Keys. For processing data items in SCSlib, diﬀerent keys are needed for decrypting sensor
values and verifying integrity and authenticity of sensor data items. However, which keys are actually needed cannot
be determined before a speciﬁc data item is processed, especially when considering random access to sensor data
items (i.e., data is not accessed in chronological order). Data protection keys needed to access sensor values are
encrypted with the public key of the service. Thus, they have to be decrypted before being used. Additionally, one
data protection key is typically used more than once during a key change interval (see Sec. 3). To prevent unnecessary
overhead, it should be avoided that the same key has to be requested from the cloud and/or decrypted more than once.
To account for this issue, we introduce internal caches in SCSlib for decrypted data protection keys as well as
public keys of data sources. As long as a key is present in the cache, it does not have to be requested from the cloud
and, in the case of data protection keys, decrypted, again. We will show in our evaluation that this has a huge impact
on the overall performance of processing protected sensor data in a cloud service. The cache size as well as the
caching algorithm can be conﬁgured. We currently support FIFO and LRU as cache management schemes.
a Our implementation of SCSlib is available at https://code.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/redmine/projects/scslib/
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Fig. 2: Average time for processing one protected sensor data item in a cloud service for diﬀerent parameters.
5. Performance Evaluation
In order to prove the feasibility of our approach and quantify the performance of SCSlib, we conducted an extensive
performance evaluation. To this end, we implemented a simple cloud service SDK using the C programming language
that returns requested sensor data items, data protection keys, and data source’s public keys from a static database as
well as a cloud service that triggers the decryption and veriﬁcation of sensor data items. In this paper, we focus on the
performance impact at a cloud service. For our evaluation, we used the cryptographic primitives AES with 128 bit keys
in CBC mode for encrypting the data ﬁeld, RSA with 2 048-bit keys for encrypting the corresponding data protection
keys, and ECDSA with NIST curve P-256 for digital signatures. In order to allow others to reproduce our results,
we use Amazon Web Services third generation EC2 64-bit instances of type large (m3.large)17 running Ubuntu 12.04
LTS. For each measurement point, we conducted 50 measurement runs, each consisting of the processing of 1 000
data items. We depict the average processing time per data item and the standard deviation for these measurements.
First, we examine the general minimal costs of processing protected sensor data in the cloud by considering only
the absolutely necessary operations. For this, we chose cache sizes (see Sec. 4) such that each key has to be requested
only once (this emulates an inﬁnite cache size). The main inﬂuence factors on the costs of processing protected
sensor data are the size of the key change interval and the number of data ﬁelds. Fig. 2a depicts the average time for
processing one protected sensor data item with one data ﬁeld with respect to the key change interval (i.e., after how
many items the data protection key is exchanged). Especially for larger key change intervals, the processing time is
dominated by the veriﬁcation of the digital signature, which constantly requires about 0.99 ms. In addition, parsing a
data item and processing keys only requires 0.02 ms. The time needed for decrypting the data item rapidly decreases
from about 1.51 ms to 0.09 ms for increasing key change intervals. In the following, we use a key change interval of
10, as this constitutes a good trade-oﬀ between ﬂexibility and performance.
Similarly, Fig. 2b illustrates the processing time of a data item with an increasing number of data ﬁelds for a key
change interval of 10. Again, signature veriﬁcation constantly requires roughly 0.99 ms. The time needed for parsing
and decrypting the data item increases linearly with the number of data ﬁelds from 0.19 ms (0.02 ms for parsing
and 0.17 ms for decrypting) for one data ﬁeld to 3.21 ms (0.12 ms for parsing and 3.09 ms for decrypting) for 20
data ﬁelds. Based on these results, we use data items with 10 data ﬁelds for our remaining evaluation. These results
constitute a lower bound for the performance, to which we compare our caching optimizations in the following.
In Fig. 2c, we evaluate the performance based on cache size and cache management schemes for data items with
10 data ﬁelds and a key change interval of 10. We diﬀerentiate between the two cache management schemes FIFO
and LRU and vary the cache size between 0 (no caching) and 1 000 (all keys cached). Furthermore, we consider
both, sequential and random processing of sensor data. In the sequential case, sensor data is processed in temporal
order (which is often observed in real-world scenarios), while in the random case, sensor data is processed in an
arbitrary, non-deterministic order (which is the most challenging scenario with respect to caching). Our results show
that caching indeed has an enormous impact on performance. With an appropriate cache size, we achieve a 6-fold
reduction in processing time from 15.91 ms to 2.62 ms, which corresponds to the lower bound (see Fig. 2b). As
expected, for sequential processing, we are able to achieve the best possible performance as soon as the cache size
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equals or exceeds the number of simultaneously required data protection keys (in our example this is ten, as we have
ten data ﬁelds per data item). Similarly, the processing time for random processing decreases linearly with the cache
size, as the likelihood that a key is still in the cache increases with the cache sizes. Our evaluation also shows that the
performance diﬀerence between FIFO and LRU is negligible in our scenario.
To conclude, our performance evaluation showed that it is feasible to process protected sensor data items in a
cloud service. SCSlib enables interoperability, allowing for an open environment and integration with diﬀerent cloud
oﬀers18. Furthermore, due to SCSlib’s caching, we can signiﬁcantly improve the per-data item processing time.
Most importantly, SCSlib enables non-security experts to develop secure cloud services. These advantages come
with higher transmission and storage overheads than tailor-made solutions for individual scenarios. However, these
overheads can be minimized by employing data item compression, e.g., using CBOR19.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a best practice approach for representing and protecting sensor data in the context of
cloud computing. Based on this approach, we proposed SCSlib, a library that enables cloud service developers to
transparently access protected sensor data. Notably, SCSlib does not require any security expertise from cloud service
developers and, at the same time, is suﬃciently ﬂexible to satisfy a wide range of performance and security require-
ments. Our evaluation results not only show the feasibility of SCSlib but also demonstrate a signiﬁcant performance
gain for sequential and random access to sensor data in the cloud. Hence, with SCSlib we contribute an important
corner stone for the secure incorporation of the two technologies sensor networks and cloud computing.
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